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It has been suggested that perception and action can be understood as evolving in tempo-
ral epochs or sequential processing units. Successive events are fused into units forming
a unitary experience or “psychological present.” Studies have identiﬁed several temporal
integration levels on different time scales which are fundamental for our understanding
of behavior and subjective experience. In recent literature concerning the philosophy and
neuroscience of consciousness these separate temporal processing levels are not always
precisely distinguished. Therefore, empirical evidence from psychophysics and neuropsy-
chology on these distinct temporal processing levels is presented and discussed within
philosophical conceptualizations of time experience. On an elementary level, one can iden-
tify a functional moment, a basic temporal building block of perception in the range of
milliseconds that deﬁnes simultaneity and succession. Below a certain threshold temporal
order is not perceived, individual events are processed as co-temporal. On a second level,
an experienced moment, which is based on temporal integration of up to a few seconds,
has been reported in many qualitatively different experiments in perception and action.
It has been suggested that this segmental processing mechanism creates temporal win-
dows that provide a logistical basis for conscious representation and the experience of
nowness. On a third level of integration, continuity of experience is enabled by working
memory in the range of multiple seconds allowing the maintenance of cognitive operations
and emotional feelings, leading to mental presence, a temporal window of an individual’s
experienced presence.
Keywords: temporal integration, time perception, the present, psychophysics
The contents of consciousness are phenomenally present – now.
This temporal aspect of phenomenal consciousness – its nowness –
is inherent in all our experiences: I see, hear, feel, and think at the
present moment (Metzinger, 2004; Droege, 2009). What is experi-
enced is experienced now. Conscious experience is not static and
unchanging; the passage of time is often described by a stream or
a ﬂow. Phenomenological analysis has pointed to these two com-
plementary (or seemingly paradoxical) aspects of experience: the
feeling of a present moment and the passage of time (James, 1890,
chapter XIV; Husserl, 1928). The unity of the present is related
to our sense of nowness. The experience of the passage of time
constitutes itself through an event that is ﬁrst anticipated, then
experienced and eventually remembered. Taken together, phe-
nomenal consciousness consists of an island of presence in the
continuous ﬂow of time related to what is happening right now
(Metzinger, 2004).
A debate exists in the philosophical literature surrounding a
presumed puzzle of how it is possible to have a temporal experi-
ence, to perceive duration, when our experiences are conﬁned to
the present moment. If perception is really limited to a present
moment then we cannot perceive motion, change, the passage of
time (Le Poidevin, 2007). This puzzle is based on the assump-
tion that an observer perceives static snapshots of the world that
somehow have to be integrated to form uniﬁed experiences over
time (Kelly, 2005). A present moment, in this line of thought,
is like a mathematical point on a continuum, an isolated and
duration-less instant in time. Accordingly, distinct and duration-
less present moments of experience have to be connected to create
phenomenal continuity over time, this conception of time essen-
tially being a cinematographic metaphor. An alternative account
of how we perceive change and succession, the ﬂow of time, is that
our experiences actually possess inherent temporal properties, i.e.,
we experience whole intervals in time (Kiverstein, 2010); succes-
sion, rhythmic grouping and motion can be directly perceived as
constituents of present experience (Stern, 1897). Our momentary
experience is embedded in a temporal ﬁeld reaching both into the
past and into the future (Stern, 1897; Lloyd, 2004, 2011). Present
experience contains traces of what has just happened and what is
anticipated, or in Husserl (1928) terms, the tripartite structure of
present experience involves retention, impression, and protention.
The perceived present represents its history and possible future,
this tripartite structure being an implicit aspect of any conscious
experience (Lloyd, 2004, 2011). According to this conception, our
present experience is characterized as stretched across time. In dif-
ferent terms, the present moment – as the “specious present” – has
duration (James, 1890, chapter XIV). Various conceptualizations
have been put forward concerning the experience of an extended
present moment. The “retentionalist” view assumes that the con-
tents of momentary experience, although the moment itself is
without extension, represent temporally extended intervals; the
“extensionalist” position assumes that experiences themselves are
deﬁned by temporally extended “chunks.” These models are not
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discussed here, but a thorough comparison of the intricate details
can be found in Dainton (2010).
The philosophical debate concerning the present moment is
mirrored by empirical research in psychology and the neuro-
sciences on the issue of temporal integration of events that consti-
tutes the“psychological present.” In fact, recent philosophical con-
tributions refer to the neuroscientiﬁc literature of how the brain
might integrate events over time; by interpreting empirical ﬁnd-
ings tentative estimates of characteristic times are provided that are
supposed to underlie the experience of the presentmoment (Pock-
ett, 2003; Kelly, 2005; Callender, 2008; Droege, 2009; Dainton,
2010). The goal of this article is to provide a systematic overview
of empirical ﬁndings in psychophysics and neuroscience pertain-
ing to temporal integration processes. This article does not aim at
contributing to the question concerning the legitimacy of merg-
ing phenomenology with neuroscience – bridging the subjective
and the objective perspective of the world, essentially the neuro-
phenomenological approach (Varela, 1999; Thompson, 2007). It
may be read as presenting knowledge of empirically identiﬁed lev-
els of temporal integration that could potentially be assigned to
phenomenal experiences of the present moment. However, this is
not a philosophical paper but a review of the empirical literature
which can be seen as a complementary attempt (from the view-
point of cognitive neuroscience and psychophysics) to summarize
and structure the body of literature on temporal integration as
potential correlates of the present moment.
In many independent conceptualizations, perception, cogni-
tion, and motor behavior are thought to happen in discrete
windows or processing epochs (White, 1963; Pöppel, 1970, 1997;
Dehaene, 1993; VanRullen and Koch, 2003). Related speciﬁcally to
the perception of time, these temporal units have been attributed
to a physiological pacemaker or “internal clock” emitting regular
pulses (Treisman, 1963). However, it is important to note that the
theoretical approach presented here is not primarily concerned
with “psychological time” or “explicit judgment of duration.”
Although empirical ﬁndings from research on time perception
will be integrated as evidence pertaining to the presented con-
ceptions, the discussed levels of temporal integration are thought
to underlie mental processing in general as particularly related to
the “present moment.”According to these conceptions, successive
events are fused into functional units forming snapshots of expe-
rience or psychological presents (Ruhnau, 1995; van Wassenhove,
2009). Essentially, temporal experience has no “null point,” which
would correspond to zero physical duration (Wackermann, 2007).
Psychophysical investigations reveal thresholds andminimal dura-
tions necessary for certain temporal experiences. Departing from
the taxonomy by Pöppel (1997) three different temporal pro-
cessing levels will be discerned which are assumed to temporally
integrate events on different time scales. Each level is discussed
to be related to different aspects of the conceptions of a present
moment and experienced presence.
THE FUNCTIONAL MOMENT
The fundamental notion that perception and action are based on
discontinuous processing of information in discrete units is char-
acterized by the idea of co-temporality, i.e., events within such
a time unit have no before–after relation (Ruhnau, 1995). This
is demonstrated by the analysis of psychophysical experiments
assessing the perception of successiveness of two events. The sen-
sory systems have different temporal resolutions for the detection
of successiveness or non-simultaneity. The highest temporal res-
olution (the lowest threshold of detection) is observed in the
auditory system, where two short acoustic stimuli which are only
2–3ms apart are detected as non-simultaneous. The visual and
the tactile system have a lower temporal resolution with respect
to non-simultaneity with thresholds of some tens of milliseconds;
inter-modal stimulation leads to the highest thresholds (Exner,
1875; Lackner and Teuber, 1973; Kirman, 1974; Lotze et al., 1999).
The detection of non-simultaneity of two short events, however,
is not perceptually sufﬁcient to indicate their temporal order.
Although we may be aware that two events did not occur simulta-
neously, we can still be unable to tell which one of the two stimuli
occurred ﬁrst. The temporal order threshold, which deﬁnes the
inter-stimulus interval between two events at which an observer
can reliably indicate the temporal order is more comparable across
senses and lies roughly at 20–60ms, to some extent depending on
physical stimulus properties (Hirsh and Sherrick, 1961; Fink et al.,
2006a;Miyazaki et al., 2006; Szymaszek et al., 2009).A similarmin-
imal threshold of at least 20ms is necessary for the identiﬁcation
of temporal order of onset between two longer complex acoustic
events, adding to the notion that the temporal-order threshold
marks a fundamental limit of temporal perception (Pastore and
Farrington, 1996).
Temporal order is a primary experiential temporal datum, con-
necting subjective experience with the objective order of events
(Wackermann, 2007, 2008). Ultimately, the notion of time is based
on the elementary temporal relation of two events,A and B, which
can be judged in their temporal order, “A occurs before B” or
“A occurs after B.” For example, music and spoken language are
only meaningful if the correct temporal order of individual com-
ponents is detected. The inversion of temporal order would lead
to a different and new experience. For this reason, experienced
temporal order as retrieved from memory appears in the same
temporal order as when it was perceived (Mach, 1911). Below the
experimentally assessed threshold of some tens of milliseconds the
temporal order of events cannot be reliably detected. Elements that
are perceived as non-simultaneous can be inter-changed without a
noticeable effect for an observer. This has, for example, lead to the
idea that temporal information within a segment of the speech
signal not exceeding the functional moment might not be rele-
vant for decoding spoken language (Kiss et al., 2008). The relation
between the perception of speech and the perception of temporal
order has repeatedly been demonstrated in studies with neuro-
logical patients suffering from aphasia and with adolescents who
have language-learning impairments (Wittmann and Fink, 2004).
These individuals have difﬁculties in discriminating consonants,
which requires the ability to detect temporal order of speech signal
components, because they have increased auditory temporal order
thresholds (Wittmann et al., 2004; Fink et al., 2006b).
Based on the empirical ﬁndings of discrete processing in per-
ception and action it has therefore been suggested that the brain
creates a-temporal system states during which incoming informa-
tion is treated as co-temporal, and which are on the one hand
responsible for binding intra- and inter-modal information and
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on the other hand create the experience of temporal order (Pöppel
et al., 1990; Ruhnau, 1995; Pöppel, 1997). The idea that percep-
tual information as well as motor commands might be processed
in discrete packets, at regular moments in time (Dehaene, 1993;
VanRullen and Koch, 2003; van Wassenhove, 2009), is in accor-
dance with the conception of a functional moment, a snapshot of
perception. Findings of several independent empirical approaches
in neuroscience have lead to the suggestion that temporal building
blocks in sensory and cognitive processing exist – responsible for
creating discrete functional units in time as well as binding spatial
features into perceptual wholes. These temporal units have been
related to rhythmic brain activity of thalamo-cortical loops, the
“gamma” band with a frequency of around 40Hz (Joliot et al.,
1994; Basar-Eroglu et al., 1996; Fries et al., 2007; Ehm et al.,
2011). However, periodicities in the alpha band (around 10Hz)
as well as the theta band (4–8Hz), and potentially related to func-
tional integration on a time scale of 100ms and above (see below),
may additionally contribute to temporal integration phenomena
(VanRullen and Koch, 2003; van Wassenhove, 2009).
It is important to note that basic temporal integration mech-
anisms uniting disparate events into perceptual segments have
been identiﬁed on different time scales and also in more com-
plex inter-sensory perceptual tasks. For example, a time frame of
about 200ms determines the integration of auditory–visual input
in speech processing when probing for the McGurk effect – an
illusory fusion percept created when lip movements are incongru-
ent to heard syllables (van Wassenhove et al., 2007). The fusion
percept was reported if the onset of lip movement and syllable
did not exceed this time lag. Temporal integration in a time frame
of around 250ms was reported in sensory–motor processing dis-
tinguishing maximum tapping speed from a personal, controlled
motor speed (Peters, 1989; Wittmann et al., 2001). With repetitive
ﬁnger movements such as with maximum tapping speed, when
inter-tap intervals are around 150ms, movements are too fast to
be represented as individual button presses within an ordered
sequence. Only when the movement slows down and inter-tap
intervals exceed at least 250ms individuated button presses are
experienced as following each other. Stimulus durations of 200–
300ms (and minimum inter-onset intervals) are a necessary pre-
requisite for the establishment of temporal order representation
for the detection of the correct sequence of four acoustic or visual
events (Warren and Obusek, 1972; Ulbrich et al., 2009). When
stimuli are shorter, or the inter-onset between stimuli is smaller,
subjects cannot reliably report the temporal order of the pre-
sented sequence. An interpretation of these ﬁnding is that if two
or more stimulus onsets fall within one window of temporal inte-
gration then temporal order cannot be experienced as the onsets
are treated as co-temporal.
Regarding this approximate time range, it has been proposed
that anterior insular cortex function may provide the continuity
of subjective awareness by temporally integrating a series of ele-
mentary building blocks – successive moments of self-realization
informed by the interoceptive system (Craig, 2009). The contin-
uous processing from moment to moment would advance with a
frame rate of about 8Hz, these temporal building blocks of per-
ception lying in the range of 125ms (Picard and Craig, 2009).
Neural microstates with average duration of 125ms as derived
fromelectrophysiological recordingshavebeendiscussed as poten-
tial “atoms of thought,” constituting critical time windows within
which neural events are functionally integrated (Lehmann et al.,
1998). In combining the two kinds of functional moments pre-
sented here, endogenous cortical rhythms in the gamma and theta
range involved in speech perception and production have been
related to corresponding left- and right-hemispheric neural acti-
vation. Speech would be processed by the left auditory cortex,
integrating the signal into 20–60ms segments which would cor-
respond to phoneme length; at the same time speech would be
processed in the right auditory cortex, integrating the signal into
segments of 100–300ms corresponding to syllabic analyzes (Poep-
pel, 2003; Giraud et al., 2007). In the context of ﬁndings of various
temporal integration phenomena it has moreover been proposed
that mental processing is organized in multiple ranges of discrete
periods which are all multiples of an absolutely smallest quan-
tal period estimated to lie at approximately 4.5ms (Geissler and
Kompass, 2003).
It has to be noted that research has identiﬁed further inte-
gration phenomena, all being on comparable time scales (Fraisse,
1984). For example, a temporal integrationwindowof 100–150ms
duration has been suggested to operate for perceptual group-
ing mechanisms of target and distractor tones in sensori-motor
processing (Repp, 2004). Using the paradigm of mismatch neg-
ativity of magnetic brain responses a window of integration of
160–170ms was estimated to bind successive auditory input into
an auditory percept (Yabe et al., 1998). Further integration lev-
els below 1 s as related to the processing of static stimuli as well
as associated with motion perception are not presented, but see
Fraisse (1984) and Dainton (2010). Potentially, many other kinds
of basic functional moments may exist.1 What these divergent ﬁnd-
ings have in common is that on a temporally ﬁne grained level in
the range of tens of milliseconds as well as of hundreds of mil-
liseconds temporal integration phenomena occur that are the basis
for the experience of temporal unity of events (below the thresh-
old) and of succession and temporal order (above the threshold).
Below the reported thresholds of around 30ms (when two short
events are presented) or of thresholds ranging between 100 and
300ms (whena streamof events is presented) temporal integration
provides functional moments of experienced co-temporality. One
could argue that these functional moments, within which events are
fused together, are not experienced as having duration. Although
the sensation of non-simultaneity implies two temporally sepa-
rated events, one could nevertheless say that the experience of
duration necessitates a clearly demarcating onset A and offset B
deﬁning an interval (with the inherent temporal orderA beforeB).
In this sense one can state that below the temporal order thresh-
old, when two events have no clear temporal relation, subjective
duration between the two stimuli is not experienced; the functional
moment has no perceivable duration.
THE EXPERIENCED MOMENT
Despite the possibly discrete nature of underlying processes in per-
ception and cognition, our phenomenal experience is nevertheless
1On the level of the functional moment the concepts of prediction (van Wassenhove
et al., 2005) and postdiction (Eagleman and Sejnowski, 2000) could be discussed.
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characterized as evolving continuously (VanRullen and Koch,
2003). Only in rare neurological disorders or under the inﬂuence
of pharmacological agents such as LSD individuals occasionally
report of perceiving a series of discrete stationary images (Dubois
and VanRullen, 2011). However, we typically do not perceive sta-
tic snapshots of the world but perceived events are embedded in
an ongoing stream of experience. Music and language are only
conceivable as consisting of extended moments, melodies, and
phrases, which inter-connect individual musical and linguistic
elements (Wittmann and Pöppel, 2000). Even when we focus
on an individual note in a musical piece or a word in a spo-
ken sentence, these acoustic events can only be understood in
its temporal relation to the preceding and the following musi-
cal or language structure. It is impossible to ignore the temporal
context of what we perceive. Lloyd (2004, 2011) has an intuitive
example for temporality in music: when we hear Paul McCart-
ney land on “Jude,” the “Hey” is still somehow present although
no longer sensed (Husserl’s retention). A listener familiar with the
Beatles, when she hears the “Hey” cannot help but already hear the
“Jude.”The“Jude” is somehowpresent but it is actually only antici-
pated (Husserl’s protention). In phenomenological terms, what we
perceive at present is strongly intertwined with what has just hap-
pened and what is about to happen (Lloyd, 2004, 2011; Kiverstein,
2010).
When listening to a metronome at moderate speed, we do not
hear a train of individual beats, but automatically form percep-
tual gestalts as an accent is perceived on every nth beat (1–2,
1–2, or 1–2–3, 1–2–3). These temporal units are mental con-
structs – physically speaking, they do not exist (Pöppel, 2009). If
the metronome is too fast, the inter-beat intervals are very short,
a fast train of beats is perceived that cannot be experienced as
containing temporally separated events with an ordered tempo-
ral structure. Subjective accentuation is not possible. If on the
other hand the metronome is too slow, inter-beat intervals are too
long, only individual beats which are not related to each other
are perceived (1–1–1 etc.). This lower and upper range of the
metronome speed at which accentuated temporal structures can
be heard deﬁnes the temporal limits of perceptual grouping on
this time scale. Empirical evidence suggests that these mental units
comprising several individual beats have a lower limit of around
250ms and an upper limit of approximately 2 s (Szelag et al., 1996;
von Steinbüchel et al., 1999; London, 2002). Further empirical
observations revealed through a systematic variation of duration
indicate that empty intervals marked by two acoustic events larger
than 150–250ms and shorter than 2 s are perceived as qualita-
tively different than intervals beyond these temporal boundaries
(Benussi, 1913; Nakajima et al., 1980). For example, two sound
bursts separated by an interval below 150ms were perceived as
one double-peaked sound; between 150ms and 2 s the two sound
bursts were clearly separated from each other but subjects still felt
a relation between them and they tried to automatically synchro-
nize their body movements to the stimulus pair; with intervals
larger than 2 s subjects reported that the two sounds were difﬁcult
to relate to each other and synchronization of body movements
was not attempted (Nakajima et al., 1980). Whereas ﬁndings of
qualitative as well as quantitative differences between intervals
below and above 2 s are predominantly found by presenting empty
intervals that are marked by two sounds (for a psychophysical
study see Getty, 1975), also regarding ﬁlled intervals it has been
shown that duration up to 2–3 s is differently processed than dura-
tion exceeding 3 s (Ulbrich et al., 2007). However, results are not
as clear cut as with empty intervals and “break points” are not
always found (Noulhiane et al., 2008; Lewis and Miall, 2009).
Temporal segmentation has been reported in further investiga-
tions in sensory–motor control. Subjects can synchronize their
motor actions to a sequence of presented tones with inter-stimulus
intervals of above 250ms (Peters, 1989). However, this synchro-
nization ability can only be maintained when inter-tone intervals
do not exceed durations of about 2–3 s. With longer intervals pre-
cise anticipation of tones – effortless timing of behavior – breaks
down (Mates et al., 1994). In a further analysis of this type of
timing behavior, time ranges between 0.45 and 1.5 s seemed to be
processed automatically, i.e., not strongly affected by secondary
task fulﬁllment, whereas concomitant processing of a secondary
task affected intervals in the range between 1.8 and 3.6 s (Miyake
et al., 2004).
Also the phenomenon of perceptual bi-stability suggests itself
for studying temporal constraints of conscious experience as one
can easily tap into the subjective percepts (Leopold et al., 2002; van
Ee, 2005). The temporal analysis of bi-stable perception has been
suggested as primary experimental approach for the understand-
ing of the dynamics of mental states (Atmanspacher and Filk,
2010). In essence, an ongoing competition between the neural
representations of the two aspects of an ambiguous ﬁgure, such
as the Necker cube, has to be resolved leading to the experi-
ence of one of the two perspectives at a given point in time.
During continuous presentation, one aspect lasts on average for
around 3 s before a switch in perspectives occurs, with some
inter-individual variability and variance attributable to stimulus
characteristics of the particular ambiguous ﬁgure (Gómez et al.,
1995; von Steinbüchel et al., 1999; Meng and Tong, 2004; Korn-
meier et al., 2007). Given its temporal dynamics, the spontaneous
switching rate has been discussed as stemming from the dis-
cussed temporal segmentationmechanism related to the subjective
present (Varela, 1999; Franck and Atmanspacher, 2009; Pöppel,
2009).
The experienced moment can be related to more elemen-
tary units of perception. For example, it has been proposed
that the temporal integration mechanism of around 3 s, evok-
ing our feeling of nowness, integrates successive processing
units of around 30ms, functional moments (Pöppel, 1997, 2009;
Szelag et al., 2004). In another line of research that treats
bi-stable perception as evolving from unstable two-state sys-
tems it was proposed that different mental processing stages
have temporal properties matching the found temporal inte-
gration levels of 30, 300, and 3 s (Atmanspacher et al., 2004;
Atmanspacher and Filk, 2010). In combining the empirical ﬁnd-
ings, temporal integration of a few seconds has been suggested
to provide the logistical basis for the subjective present (Pöp-
pel, 1978, 2009; Fraisse, 1984; Szelag et al., 2004). Whereas
the duration of the functional moment is not perceived, an
experienced moment relates to the experience of an extended
now. According to this conception, the experienced moment has
duration.
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MENTAL PRESENCE
A temporal interval with duration exceeding about 3 s is expe-
rienced as being qualitatively different than shorter duration.
When two events are separated by an interval of, say, 6 s, the
experience of “emptiness” evolves, events are not bound together
and the length of the interval separating the two becomes the
focus of attention (Wackermann, 2007). A pause in a conversa-
tion, if it reaches 6 s, might be felt as disturbingly long. In that
sense, duration longer than 3 s leads to the predominant experi-
ence of an extended temporal interval. On the other side of the
spectrum, what is the maximum time interval an observer can
directly experience? It is well possible to judge the duration of
1 h, i.e., pressing a button every time one thinks that an hour
has passed (Aschoff, 1998). However, it is impossible to main-
tain a 1-h time interval continuously in the focus of awareness
(Wackermann, 2007). During such a period of 1 h a multitude of
experiences accumulates that later can be retrieved from mem-
ory forming temporal cues that can be used to judge duration
retrospectively (Zakay and Block, 1997). But then the question
remains what the upper limit of integration in prospective time
perception might be, that is, of the perception of duration as
presently and continuously experienced? More generally formu-
lated and more importantly, what are the temporal boundaries
of perception that allow us to hold events in present experience,
in mental presence? Whereas the experienced moment forms an
elementary unit, a temporally uniﬁed percept, mental presence
involves the experience of a perceiving and feeling agent (“my
self”)within awindowof extendedpresence,a phenomenon that is
based on working memory function. “Working memory provides
a temporal bridge between events – both those that are internally
generated and environmentally presented – thereby conferring a
sense of unity and continuity to conscious experience” (Goldman-
Rakic, 1997). An experienced moment happens now, for a short
but extended moment. Mental presence encloses a sequence of
such moments for the representation of a uniﬁed experience of
presence.
Reports from neurological case studies with individuals who
suffer from anterograde amnesia after bilateral damage to the
hippocampus indicate that these patients live within a mov-
ing temporal window of presence that does not reach beyond
their short-term or working memory span, incapable of storing
incidents into episodic long-term memory (Scoville and Milner,
1957). These patients can hold information for a limited time
in memory, they perform short tasks accurately and seemingly
behave normal; but already after a few minutes they can not recall
what has just happened (for a striking description of a patient
with anterograde amnesia, see Sacks, 1986). Due to their neu-
rological impairment, patients with anterograde amnesia can act
adequately within the temporal constraints of their functioning
working memory, which accordingly must be a temporal con-
straint for mental presence, the continuous awareness of oneself
as presently perceiving and acting within an environment. These
clinical cases emphasize the functioning of short-term memory in
healthy humans and how it can be interpreted as forming temporal
boundaries of present awareness.
Experimental investigations of short-term memory show how
the number of correct recalls of presented syllables decreases
with increasing interval length between stimulus presentation
and recall – in the range of multiple seconds – if the rehearsal
of syllables is prevented (Peterson and Peterson, 1959; Baddeley,
1990). The capacity of short-term retention is deﬁned as gradual
loss of memorized elements as time passes. The typical retention
functions described by logarithmic and exponential ﬁts decrease
rapidly at ﬁrst and then levels out on a plateau (Rubin andWenzel,
1996). One could state that the time frame provided by short-term
memory (related,working memory) creates a temporal horizon of
experience which in humans contains descriptive–narrative ele-
ments created by our capacity for language (Varela, 1999). Within
this temporal horizon mental presence unfolds integrating mental
processes and enabling conscious experience of a narrative self that
has personal identity and continuity over time (Gallagher, 2000).
Mental presence is bound to the ability of maintaining mental
representations in an active state for a certain period of time. It
depends on the integration of multiplemental operations that lead
to intentional behavior – created by ongoing activity of a global
workspace, integrating activity from multiple distributed and spe-
cialized brain areas (Baars, 1988; Dehaene and Naccache, 2001).
Essentially, it is working memory, a system of limited attentional
capacity, supplemented by visuospatial, episodic, and phonologic
storage systems,which holds information for temporal storage and
manipulation (Baddeley, 2003).
In duration reproduction tasks, individuals have to reproduce
temporal intervals by pressing a key to indicate that a second
comparison stimulus has reached the duration of a previously
presented stimulus. The mean of reproduced intervals is accu-
rate for shorter intervals of up to 3 s but with increasing interval
lengths are progressively under-reproduced relative to physical
time (Eisler and Eisler, 1992; Wackermann, 2005; Ulbrich et al.,
2007; Wittmann et al., 2010). The negative curvature of the dura-
tion reproduction function results in an asymptotic upper limit
of duration accessible to experience, i.e., a temporal horizon of
experienced time in the range of roughly 102 s (Wackermann,
2007). Note, that the negative curvature in duration reproduc-
tion performance is found in those studies where subjects are
instructed or discouraged from counting (Rattat and Droit-Volet,
2011). Without chronometric counting, the immediate experi-
ence of duration is limited by an ultimate temporal horizon of
reproducibility due to memory-loss of duration representation
over time; temporal resolution of duration blurs with increasing
interval length (Wackermann, 2007, 2008).2 It is tempting to sug-
gest that a healthy individual’s short-term memory span is related
to the upper limit of prospective time perception; the limits of
temporal experience, of perceiving duration continuously, would
2A famous patient with anterograde amnesia, H.M., as studied by Richards (1973)
was supposedly found to show an impaired performance in duration reproduction
at longer time intervals. This claim, however, is not substantiated by the available
data (Wackermann, personal communication). When plotting the behavioral data
of H.M. as absolute values, extracted by Eisler and Eisler (2001), and not as log–log
plots one can see a perfect asymptotic curve for stimulus durations ranging from 1
to 300 s. A parametric ﬁt using the ‘dual klepsydra model’ (Wackermann and Ehm,
2006) revealed that parameter κ, reﬂecting the progressive under-reproduction of
duration, with 0.011 s−1 is in a typical range of adult subjects (Wackermann, 2005).
That is, H.M. was able to time his behavior adequately within the time range of his
mental presence.
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thereafter rely on the basic temporal properties of working mem-
ory. In fact, decay of memory traces has been discussed to underlie
the experience of duration. Since memory strength decreases with
time, memory trace decay could actually function as a “clock”
(Staddon, 2005). That way, the same processes would underlie for-
getting as well as time perception. This memory-loss component
is an intrinsic feature of the “dual klepsydra model” (Wackermann
and Ehm, 2006; Wackermann, 2008), where subjective duration is
represented by the state of a lossy accumulator. This accumulator
receives inﬂow for the build-up of duration presentation of a stim-
ulus that has to be judged. A simultaneous outﬂow reﬂects the loss
of representation leading to typical responses in psychophysical
tasks, indicative of “subjective shortening” of stored duration over
time.
There is no absolute, ﬁxed temporal boundary of mental pres-
ence. The reports of a limiting value in the order of magnitude
of 102 s in the ability to reproduce duration indicate that the
representation of increasing duration becomes more and more
compressed. The duration reproduction curve becomes increas-
ingly ﬂatter, i.e., with increasing temporal intervals differences
in physical duration are represented with decreasing resolution
(Wackermann, 2007).
That is, the reported limits in duration reproduction and short-
term memory do not point to absolute and static boundaries –
correspondingly, mental presence has no ﬁxed duration – but to
a gradual dissolving of representation with increasing duration.
Related to this temporal characteristic, mental presence is related
to the fact that once attended objects slowly phase out of expe-
rience over time; that is, the phenomenally experienced sliding
window of mental presence co-occurs with the constant loss of
memory contents. The moving window of presence is related to
the constant sequential input of a sequence of perceived events,
which each fade out of working memory one after the other after
some time. Mental presence is a temporal platform of multiple
seconds within which an individual is aware of herself and the
environment, where sensory–motor perception, cognition, and
emotion are interconnected features of representation leading to
phenomenal experience.
CONCLUSION
Facing the puzzle of how we can perceive duration of events if our
perception is bound to the present moment, more than 1600 years
ago St. Augustine gave an answer (Flasch, 1993). Although the
present (praesens tempus) has no extension as it passes away in
a moment (in puncto praeterit ), an observation nevertheless has
extension (distentio) through temporally lasting attention (atten-
tio) which encompasses the anticipation of events (expectatio) that
eventually fade into memory (memoria); here, anticipation and
memory are part of an extended present where attention lasts for
some time (Confessions, book XI; section XXVIII.37 in Flasch,
1993). Moreover, conscious experience involving a sense of self
may only be understood as an entity that is extended over time
(Zahavi, 2005; Wittmann, 2009; Stolzenberg, 2010). It is obvious
that St. Augustine’s conception of time has strong similarities to
Husserl (1928) tripartite structure of present experience.Although
a variety of philosophicalmodels concerning the presentmoments
exists, important in the present context is the common insight that
the present moment is experienced as extended. Also our every-
day language use implies that what is happening at the present
moment typically has duration.3
Present experience on the level of content is a continuously
evolving phenomenon and individual events are embedded in an
extended temporal ﬁeld (Stern, 1897; Lloyd, 2004, 2011). A sud-
denly occurring short stimulus of a fewmillisecondsmight actually
be perceived as a point in time. Moreover, psychophysical inves-
tigations in which stimulus properties are systematically varied
reveal thresholds of experience below which no temporal relation-
ship is perceived. In these limiting cases disclosed by psychophysics
one can actually speak of functional moments without perceivable
duration because temporal order, a primary experiential datum, is
not detected. This single momentary event is nevertheless part of a
continuous and extended experience. For example, if a short tone
with a lower pitch is followed by another short tone with a slightly
higher pitch, the impression of a single tone rising in pitch can be
elicited (Fink et al., 2006a). Within different modalities, the rapid
serial appearance of two or more stimuli at different positions can
give the impression of apparent motion (Exner, 1875; Kirman,
1974). That is, the common cases of perception, in accordance
with the phenomenological analysis of our Lebenswelt, suggest
that subjective time provides a frame of reference within which
moments are stretched out over time.
The integration level of the experienced moment is the basic
operational platform within which temporality can evolve. The
unit that the ﬁrst two words in the Beatles lyrics “Hey Jude” form,
as short as the overall duration may seem, involves anticipation
and memory which are activated while the “Hey” passes over to
“Jude” (Lloyd, 2004, 2011). After having heard “Hey Jude” some
people might even anticipate the “. . .don’t make it bad.” Then,
however, the two verses may already fall into two different experi-
enced moments. The break between the two subunits “Hey Jude”
and “. . .don’t make it bad” points to a general principle in poems
and in music where caesurae form boundaries between which
individual verses are recited; across different languages and cul-
tures the duration of these lyrical and musical units seems not
to exceed 3 s (Pöppel, 1988; Turner and Pöppel, 1988). Beyond
the experienced moment successive events are less strongly bound
together. “Hey Jude” is a stronger bounded unit than “Hey Jude,
don’t make it bad.” And with increasingly longer intervals tem-
porally separate components within these units will become less
strongly connected; retention and protention are temporally lim-
ited in the way that they cover only what has just happened and is
about to happen in the range of a few seconds, working memory
span forming a boundary of present experience as mental presence.
The discussed examples in literature of experienced temporality
refer to situations concerning temporal integration in the several
seconds range. Husserl (1928, p. 383) discusses the situation of
hearing a melody which is only possible because individual tones
are integrated to formaperceptualwhole. Kelly (2005) presents the
example of hearing a steady high C produced by an opera singer
3When J. W. Goethe’s Faust proclaims: “When, to the Moment then, I say: Ah, linger
on, thou art so fair!” (“Werd ich zum Augenblicke sagen: Verweile doch! Du bist
so schön!”), he deﬁnitely refers to an extended moment that he would like to see
prolonged indeﬁnitely.
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who holds that note for some time – for the listener subjectively
going on for a long time – that is, for several seconds.
Different from this phenomenological notion of retention and
protention is the conception of time perspective as a fundamen-
tal cognitive dimension partitioning human experience into past,
present, and future (Zimbardo and Boyd, 1999). Past and future in
this context can span decades, as far as long-term memory reaches
back in time and as far as we plan our future. Through this par-
titioning of time, the notion of a presence becomes meaningful
since the explicit representation of the present perspective is only
possible through its distinction from past and future (Droege,
2009). Within the realm of the mental presence an individual can
be considered fully operational as she tracks current conditions,
compares themwithmemories of past incidences, andmakes plans
for the future. The past and the future as presently experienced
can also be explicitly judged in relation to subjective time. When
judging the past, we typically perceive the decades of our lives to
speed up as we get older (Wittmann and Lehnhoff, 2005). Related
to the future, we constantly generate predictions about how long
it will take for some events to occur, these temporal estimates
eventually leading to decisions regarding options with different
delays (Wittmann and Paulus, 2009). For example, a person who
chooses to save money opts for a momentary loss of money that
otherwise would be available now in order to gain a future greater
beneﬁt.
A fundamental question remains of how lower-level tempo-
ral units are bound together forming higher-level units; a variety
of concepts has been rigorously discussed by Dainton (2010).
Independent of how the sequential units of lower-level units
might be related to each other, potentially overlapping each other
or following in direct succession, continuity of experience has
been considered to stem from an ongoing semantic connection
across individual segments, which masks the discontinuity of the
sequential units (Pöppel, 1997; Droege, 2009). Regarding specif-
ically the continuity of experience across experienced moments,
working memory related to semantic and episodic content might
bind together the sequence of temporal segments of nowness
that leads to the experience of mental presence. The experienced
moment is deﬁned as what is occurring now as immediate expe-
rience. It is also a prerequisite for interpersonal communica-
tion between two individuals made possible by synchronizing
the moments of individuals, thereby creating shared moments
of presence for effortless interaction – an essential feature in
music, conversation, and dance (Wittmann and Pöppel, 2000).
However, the experience of a self acting in its environment,
remembering the past and planning the future necessitates an
integration interval – as has been related to mental presence –
exceeding the postulated 3-s time window of the experienced
moment. Continuity of experience only unfolds as mental pres-
ence, which is a ﬂoating window of feeling present and acting at
present.
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